This paper investigates the impact of US Export-Import Bank (EXIM) on US exports particularly in the wake of international competition from foreign national export credit agencies (ECAs). We employ a gravity framework on a country-industry-year-level panel dataset that matches EXIM authorizations with US bilateral exports. Our results depict the general ineffectiveness of the Bank in promoting exports within and across industries. Some heterogeneities behind the general finding are also uncovered: industries other than aerospace parts and products are more likely to benefit from EXIM authorizations, and that EXIM authorizations to larger businesses seem to be more effective in encouraging exports. Furthermore, we find no evidence that explains the role of EXIM in encouraging US exports by offsetting foreign ECA competition. These results are neither affected by competing countries' membership to the OECD Arrangement nor by the size of American firms that received EXIM support. Our results cast doubt on the ubiquitously positive claims made by the Bank and its supporters, yet also provide policy lessons for countries that are either in the inception stages of establishing their own ECAs or are now placing greater importance on ECA financing in encouraging domestic exports.
Introduction
The positive role of trade financing in facilitating international trade is ubiquitously agreed and confirmed by researchers (e.g. Chor and Manova, 2012; Manova, 2013) . However, the impact of trade financing provided by national export credit agencies (ECAs) is much less in the clear. While one camp advocates ECA financing and endorses its positive effect on a country's exports and jobs, the other camp doubts the efficiency of this non-market intervention and raises concern about the unintended distortions brought about by such government interventions. 1 In the US, this debate reached its climax when its Export-Import Bank (EXIM), the official export credit agency (ECA) of the country, closed to new business after June 30, 2015. 2 Despite the sharp controversy around the functions of the EXIM Bank, surprisingly no systematic evidence exists in the academic literature regarding the effectiveness of the US EXIM Bank in promoting trade.
In this paper, we take on this question by investigating whether and how, if any, support (in the form of authorizations) provided by the US EXIM Bank affects US exports. We try to uncover the heterogeneity under this potential export-promoting effect of EXIM authorization across various dimensions including industries, regions and size of American companies that received EXIM support. 3 We then move on to examining whether the potential export-promoting effect of EXIM authorization is affected by competition from other countries' ECA-financed exporting activities particularly in the wake of international institutional arrangements like the OECD Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits (Arrangement hereafter).
Using panel data on US export flows disaggregated by receiving country, industry, and year, our first set of results provides no detectable evidence on the export-promoting effects of EXIM authorization. However, further inspection reveals that this insignificant effect masks heterogeneities: EXIM authorizations to all sectors except for aerospace products and parts (NAICS 3364) has a significantly positive effect on US exports, and that this effect is observable for American companies that are not classified as small by the Bank. Furthermore, we find that positive average exportpromoting effect of EXIM authorization is not affected by competition from foreign government ECA-financed exporting activities, and that this effect is neither affected by foreign governments' accession to the Arrangement nor by the size of American companies that received EXIM assistance.
We continue to find that the general ineffectiveness of EXIM authorization is robust when when taking into account the heterogeneity associated with an industry's position in the value chain, and when accounting for the possibility of influences that may spill over across sectors.
The above results have important policy implications for policymakers from both the US and other countries across the world, in general. It brings to attention the importance of going beyond evaluating a general export-promoting effect of ECA financing, and exploring the heterogeneity behind this general effect across various country-relevant dimensions. It calls attention to the significance of ECAs in offsetting competition from other countries ECA-financed exporting activities.
Consequently, it revives the political debate on whether resorting to domestic institutions is the an-1 See James (2011) for a review of the viewpoints of both camps. 2 On December 4, 2015, the Bank was reauthorized by the Congress for business as usual. 3 We look at these dimensions because of its explicit focus in the US EXIM Bank Charter.
swer to improving trade competitiveness or does it not lead to protectionism through subsidizes, and further aggravate market distortions, domestically and internationally. It also rekindles the debate on countries binding constraints under various international institutional arrangements, and the countering effect on countries international commitments from accession to these arrangements.
Our analysis extends the existing studies that establish a positive and significant impact of trade credit insurance on trade. In a pioneering study, Egger and Url (2006) analyze Austrian export flows disaggregated by receiving country and industry, and show that export credit guarantees extended by Austria's ECA, Oesterreichische Kontrollbank (OeKB), indeed fosters economic activity, resulting in a multiplier effect of 2.8. Furthermore, ECA financing not only results in the broadening of trade partners towards high-risk regions but also leaves the goods structure of foreign trade almost unchanged. Moser et al. (2008) analyze German export flows, disaggregated by receiving country and year, and show that export credit guarantees extended by Germany's official ECA, Euler Hermes (Hermes), does lead to higher German exports with a multiplier effect of about 1.7. More so, the effectiveness of ECA financing crucially hinges on both the sample of countries and the time period considered. Both studies above show a more than proportional effect of export credit guarantees on export volumes with short-run effects of ECA financing on export volumes being smaller than longrun effects largely because of the lag between the day when a guarantee is provided and the actual shipment of the good.
In a similar vein, Felbermayr and Yalcin (2013) study German export flows disaggregated by receiving country and industry, and document that a 1% increase in export credit guarantees extended by Hermes, boost exports on average by about 0.012%. Moreover, they show that the effectiveness of Hermes in increasing exports varies across sectors, regions and income groups. In particular, Hermes effect is large in a small number of sectors which are aviation, shipbuilding and transportations sector. Characterized by high time-to-build lags and large external financial dependence, these sectors indicate that Hermes' guarantees alleviate sectoral financial frictions. Lastly, they show that Hermes does not play a strong role in reducing the impact of financial frictions in importing countries on German exports. Likewise, the less vulnerable sectors are with respect to credit constraints, the smaller the positive Hermes effect becomes. Additionally, they show that Hermes have helped contain export collapse during the recent financial crisis of 2008, particularly in sectors with higher credit constraints. At a more disaggregated level, Badinger and Url (2013) analyze a cross-section of 178 firms for the year 2008, and show that export credit guarantees extended by OeKB increases firm-exports from some 80% to 100%. More so, the effect of export credit guarantees is larger for exports to countries with higher credit risk. The generally positive pro-trade impact of trade credits is confirmed in some other studies with data collected either from Berne Union or individual export credit insurer (van der Veer, 2015; Korinek et al., 2010; Auboin and Engemann, 2014) .
Our analysis is also broadly related to the literature which shows that negative shocks to bankintermediated trade finance, particularly at times of financial distress at the banks, reduce the volume of exports for firms that continue exporting to a given product-destination market (i.e. intensive margin), and has no impact on the probability that a firm exists or enters new product and destination markets (i.e. extensive margin) (Amiti and Weinstein, 2011; Paravisini et al., 2014; Prete and Fed-erico, 2014) . They argue that shortages in bank-intermediated trade finance reduce exports through raising the variable cost of production rather than the cost of financing sunk entry investments.
Last, our research is linked to an increasing body of literature on the impact of trade finance on a country' level and pattern of international trade, both at the macro-and micro-level (e.g. Chor and Manova, 2012; Manova, 2013; Manova et al., 2015) . This line of research argues that financial comparative advantage alleviates the substantial sunk, fixed and variable costs of trade such that financially developed economies export more, especially in financially vulnerable sectors, through entering more markets, shipping more products to each destination, and selling more of each product.
While our empirical approach is closed related to Egger and Url (2006) , Moser et al. (2008) , and Felbermayr and Yalcin (2013) , we make several important extensions and contributions to this growing body of literature. First, to the best of our knowledge about the academic literature, we provide the first rigorous evaluation of the effectiveness of US EXIM Bank, a dominant player in the world EXIM financing. Second, this is the first paper that provides evidence on whether EXIM authorization enables domestic exporters to overcome the competition emanating from foreign government ECA financing, particularly in cases where foreign government ECAs are acceded to the OECD Arrangement. Finally, we investigate whether and how EXIM financing enables exporters to move up the industrial chain and evolve itself in the global value chain, offering the first evidence of its kind in the context of global production networks.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we propose an empirical gravity framework for the estimation of the effect of EXIM support. Section 3 provides a background on the US EXIM Bank. Section 4 describes the data and offers some descriptive evidence. Section 5 presents our results and analysis of the possible influencing channels. Section 6 concludes this paper with a discussion on the limitations and possibilities of future research.
Estimation Framework
Based on the theoretical underpinning of the gravity model of trade (e.g. Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003) , market clearance and general equilibrium imply that bilateral trade between countries can be expressed as
where exports of good k from country i to country j in year t, X ijkt , depend on a range of factors: country j's expenditure on k in t, E jkt ; an adjustment factor e f (·) which is a function of US EXIM support S jkt ; the share of country i in the world production of k in t,
; bilateral trade costs τ ijkt ;
and multilateral resistance terms P ikt P jkt . The parameter σ k , which is assumed to be greater than one, is the elasticity of substitution specific to good k and common across countries.
Taking natural logarithms of the both sides of (1) and setting i = U S gives
A challenge in practice with the estimation of the above specification is that it is difficult to find data for the variables E jkt ,
, τ U S jkt , P U S kt , and P jkt that are time variant for disaggregated industries. To overcome this difficulty, we make assumptions that the values of E jkt and
are time functions of their base-year values, and the variables τ U S jkt , P U S kt , and P jkt are proportional to their country-level counterparts with the proportions remaining stable over time:
Now inserting (3) into (2) and further assuming the linearity of f (·) (i.e. f (S jkt ) = αS jkt ) and the constancy of the elasticity of substitution between all goods (i.e. σ k = σ), we have
Merging overlapping parameters, we have the following equation for empirical estimation:
where the vector X jkt contains additional controls, φ t captures all unobserved time-specific factors, η jk absorbs all country-industry-specific factors including the time-invariant variable E jk , and the error term jkt represents the white noise of the model.
As the standard practice in the empirical gravity literature, we assume bilateral trade costs τ U S j,t to be a function of a number of geographical, cultural, and institutional factors:
where dist U S j is the logged geographical distance between country j and the US weighted by the population of countries, lang U S j is a dummy which takes on the value of one if country j has the same official language (i.e. English) as the US and zero otherwise, contig U S j is a dummy for sharing the border with the US, leg U S j is a dummy for having the same legal origin as the US, curr U S j is a dummy for sharing the same official currency (i.e. the US dollar) as the US, wto U S jt the dummy for the partner country being a member of GATT/WTO as is the US, and rta U S jt the dummy for being in a common regional free trade agreement with the US.
Following Baier and Bergstrand (2009) and Berger et al. (2013) , the multilateral resistance terms are approximated by a first-order log-linear Taylor-series expansion of the system of price equations in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) . Specifically, it is shown that under the assumption of symmetry of bilateral trade costs, the multilateral resistance terms can be expressed as GDP-weighted average trade costs:
where ω lt ≡ Y lt /Y t is the share of country l in world GDP.
Plugging (6) into (7) gives a function of the multilateral resistance terms as a linear combination of observable components of trade costs as in (6):
where
ω l,t ω mt s kmt , f or s = wto, rta.
Therefore we can now control for trade costs and multilateral resistance terms jointly using the same set of observable variables:
3 Background of the US EXIM Bank The Bank abides by international disciplines for government-backed ECA activity under the OECD Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits (the "Arrangement" hereafter). The Arrangement is a "Gentlemen's Agreement" negotiated by the participants to the Arrangement. 7 Its main purpose is to provide a framework for the orderly use of government-backed export financing (within the participating countries), with the goal of encouraging competition among exporters based on quality and price of goods and services rather than on the most favorable government-backed financing terms and conditions. The financing terms and conditions could be related to minimum interest rates, risk fees, and maximum repayment terms. Rules on minimum interest rates ensure that the US EXIM Bank no longer offers loans with below-cost interest rates and long repayment terms to compete with such practices by other governments. The OECD views the Arrangement as "rules" defining constraints on members' lending activity.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data used in this study is drawn from the annual accounting reports of the EXIM Bank which is made available under the Open Government Directive. The dataset contains information 4 Section 2(b)(1)(B), the Charter of the Export-Import Bank of the United States (the Charter hereafter), updated February 29, 2016.
5 It does not have a quantitative target to promote the exports of goods and services related to renewable energy sources, and to promote financing to sub-Saharan Africa. See in the Charter Section 2(b)(1)(E)(v) for small business, Section 2(b)(1)(K) for renewable energy, and Section 2(b)(9)(A) for Sub-Saharan Africa.
6 Section 8A, the Charter. 7 The participants to the OECD Arrangement currently are: Australia, Canada, the EU, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the United States. Brazil is a participant to the Sector Undertaking On Export Credits For Civil Aircraft. This information has been gathered from the Agreement on Officially Supported Export Credits, February 1, 2016, TAD/PG(2016)1. For the purpose of this paper, countries in the EU are taken from https://www.gov.uk/eu-eea.
on the transactions that has been authorized under each program: direct loan, loan guarantees, and export credit insurance. Transaction detail includes the amount of financing approved, the financing approved to small American businesses, 8 country of the foreign buyer, industry classification of the product for which EXIM financing is procured (reported either at 6-digit NAICS or 4-digit SIC code), amongst others.
In order to identify the export-promoting effects of EXIM authorization, we supplement the EXIM data with the US exports data from UN COMTRADE. Using concordances from US Census Bureau and US Bureau of Economic Analysis, we aggregate the industry classification to 4-digit IO/NAICS sectors. After cleaning the data, our sample comprises of 148,708 observations resulting from a three dimensional panel of 226 countries, 94 industries and 7 years spanning from 2007 to 2013. On the one hand, only 11% of the country-industry-year observations records no imports from the US. The remaining 89% have imports from the US at least once across all the 7 years, 62% imported from the US for all 7 years in the dataset. On the other hand, 96% of the country-industry-year observations received no EXIM authorization. The remaining 4% report to having been authorized by the Bank at least once across the 7 years, while only 0.13% report to having been authorized by the Bank for all the years in the sample period. Tables 1 and 2 reveal the skewed distribution of EXIM authorization across countries and industries where the Bank does not necessarily authorizes its available funds to those countries and industries that dominate US exports. For instance, India received a maximum 10.96% share of the Bank's portfolio followed by Saudi Arabia at 10.55%. Nevertheless, total exports to India and Saudi Arabia accounted for only 1.46% and 1.08% share of total US exports as against the maximum 20.76% share of total US exports to Canada who received only 1.60% share in the Bank's portfolio.
In a similar vein, while aerospace products and parts (NAICS 3364) received a maximum 49.09%
share of the Bank's portfolio, its exports accounted for only 2.19% of total US exports as opposed to the maximum 6.22% share of petroleum and coal products (NAICS 3240) exports that received only 0.06% share in the Bank's authorization. Table 3 shows that there is a negative correlation between what the Bank authorizes to a region in total and what it authorizes to small businesses for that particular region. For instance, for the period 2007 through 2013, Asian region received the highest share in the Bank's total authorization portfolio of loans, guarantees and insurance at 34.4%, of which only 2% was authorized to small businesses.
On the contrary, for the same period, Caribbean region received the lowest share in the Bank's total authorization portfolio at 1.1%, of which, however, 24.7% was authorized to small businesses. It 8 The US EXIM Bank adopts the qualifying criteria for "small business" from the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) definition. SBA has established a "Table for Small Business Size Standards" for industries in the North American Industry Classification System, where the size standards are based on either annual sales or average employment. The latest table updated on February 26, 2016 can be accessed from the SBA website at https://www.sba.gov/sites/ default/files/files/Size_Standards_Table.pdf. should be noted that on a global scale the Bank's authorization to small businesses ranges from 5%
to 11% for the period 2007 through 2013, which is well below the mandated authorization to small businesses at 20%. 9
The definitions and summary statistics of the main variables of this research are contained in Table 4 . Not surprisingly, the variables for exports and EXIM authorizations have large standard deviations relative to their means as a result of the highly skewed distributions as seen from above.
The gravity variables contain sufficient variations representing a wide spectrum of characteristics of US trade partners in the data. The four standardized foreign ECA competition measures show varying degrees of ECA competition US exporters face in foreign markets (see Section 5.3 for the details about the construction of these measures).
Results

Baseline results
We now turn to our formal regression analysis, looking into the estimated results of eq. (5) in various forms. Note that since our data is rectangularized (i.e. expanded so that all possible countryindustry-year combinations exist) to facilitate gravity analysis, a great number of zeros are created. 10
In our baseline regressions, we adopt three approaches to address the issue of the excessive number of zeros. First, we follow the common practice of adding one US dollar to both export and EXIM authorization values before taking logs so that all observations are kept in log transformation. Second, Note. This table reports the distribution of US EXIM funds across regional markets. For each region, three rows of numbers are displayed: row (a) gives the value of EXIM authorization granted each year, row (b) shows the share of (a) in the total US EXIM authorization granted to all markets in that year, and row (c) reports the percentage of (a) that is granted to small businesses. we replace the continuous EXIM authorization measure with an EXIM authorization indicator which takes on the value of one if a country-industry-year observation receives positive EXIM authorization and zero otherwise, which allows us to estimate the effect of receiving any positive EXIM authorization as a whole.Third, we use Poisson estimations to avoid adding one to the dependent variable (i.e. exports) (e.g. Silva and Tenreyro, 2006) .
The results are reported in Table 5 , where a combination of country-, industry-, and timedummies as well as their dyadic interactions is explored. We find that the coefficient on the contemporaneous EXIM authorization variable, whether continuous or binary, is negative but statistically insignificant from zero when stronger specifications of fixed effects (country-industry fixed effects) are imposed in columns 2-3 and 5-6. This implies that in a given year, EXIM authorizations do not have a sizable impact on US exports with its partner countries. The sign and magnitude of the estimated elasticity of EXIM authorizations with respect to US exports stand in contrast to the positive and significant estimates found by Egger and Url (2006) Note that it is possible that EXIM authorization in a given year translates into exports in the following years for two reasons. First, because we measure EXIM support as total authorization, it often takes more than one year (especially for longer-term loans) for all the authorized funds to be disbursed for trade. Second, there may exist some time gap between the authorization and the actual availability of funds for use (Egger and Url, 2006; Moser et al., 2008) . Therefore, to test whether EXIM authorization has an effect beyond the year of authorization, in columns 8-10 we introduce lagged EXIM authorization variables which take into account EXIM authorization in both present and past years. We find that the coefficient on the lagged EXIM authorization variable, whether continuous or binary, stay insignificant. This implies that there are no detectable time lag effects of EXIM authorization.
The above analysis consists of all industries which are treated equally in the regression. Nevertheless, given the lion's share of aerospace parts and products (NAICS 3364) in the Bank's authorization portfolio as noted from above (as seen in Table 2 , approximately half of the Bank's authorization is granted to exports in this category), it is necessary to separate this particular industry from others in estimation. Consequently, estimates presented in Table 6 show that EXIM authorization to sectors other than aerospace parts and products has a significant but very small positive effect on US export activities: we estimate an elasticity of 0.003 for the present-year effect (column 10), which suggests that an increase in EXIM authorization by 10% creates additional exports by 0.03% in the same year. If lags of EXIM authorization are accounted for, we find an increase in the magnitude of EXIM authorization effect in the range of 0.007 (column 11), suggesting that a 10% expansion in EXIM authorization generates a 0.07% increase in exports. To better grasp the economic meaning of the magnitude, we compute average elasticity. Country-industry average of EXIM authorization is 
(8) Note. This table reports baseline regression results on the effect of EXIM support on US exports. The dependent variable is the log value of US exports ln X U S jkt . 1(EXIM>0) is a dummy which takes on the value of one when EXIM authorization is positive and zero otherwise. EXIM support is the log value of US EXIM authorization. The suffixes "past 2 yrs" and "past 3 yrs" indicates variables that take last two or three years' data as a whole. Trade cost and multilateral resistance terms are constructed as a function of observable variables defined at the country pair-year level: distance, dummies for sharing a common official language, a common border, a common legal origin, a colonial relationship historically, and dummies for both being in GATT/WTO and a common regional trade agreement. Destination income per capita is GDP per capita in US$ in 2005 constant prices, and bilateral exchange rate is the exchange rate of the local currency against US$, both obtained from World Development Indicators. Industry external financial dependence measure is from Chor and Manova (2012) , and is further multiplied with year dummies so that its effect is allowed to vary across both industries and years. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at country-industry level. Superscripts *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. It should also be noted that: (a) lags of EXIM authorization beyond two years, do not have an impact on US exports (column 12), and (b) the effect of EXIM authorization is greater for model with lags (column 11) when compared to models with contemporaneous effect (column 10). As we do not find evidence of export-promoting benefits arising from EXIM authorization to the aerospace parts and products sector (columns 1-6), the remaining analysis focuses on other sectors.
EXIM financing to small businesses
We now proceed to disentangle the export-promoting effect of EXIM authorization across American companies of different sizes. This is particularly motivated by the rising debate around the need to provide EXIM support for small exporting businesses and its potential impact on their exports.
Proponents, on the one hand, argue that the value of small businesses' exports has grown markedly in recent years because the Bank shoulders some of the risks of international deals and provides private-market alternative financing. For instance, John Murphy, the senior vice president of the US Chamber of Commerce, argues that buyers overseas increasingly expect vendors to offer financing.
In such a case, without the Bank, many US small businesses would be unable to extend terms to foreign buyers and would have to ask for cash-in-advance. 12 Moreover, commercial banks often refuse to accept foreign receivables as collateral for a loan without the Bank's guarantee. 13 Opponents, on the other hand, argue that the significant growth of small businesses' exports is unlikely to have Taking these contradictory observations to the data, and estimating eq. (5) for small and nonsmall businesses groups, the estimates presented in columns 1-3 in Table 7 show that EXIM authorization to small businesses does not have an impact on their exports. On the contrary, it is the businesses that are not classified as small by the Bank that witness a positive impact of EXIM authorization on their exports with an upto two-year lag.
These results suggest that EXIM authorization to small exporting businesses does not serve as a strong engine for US exports. Although transactions for small business exporters increased from 85.6% of the total number of transactions in 2007 to nearly 90% in 2013, representing the high- 11 The figures used to calculate elasticities in this section are based on the real term values corresponding to the relevant non-zero sub-samples in the dataset.
12 http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-budget/246347-the-arguments-for-ex-im-no-one-can-rebut. 13 http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-budget/246347-the-arguments-for-ex-im-no-one-can-rebut. 
Exports of aerospace products industry
Exports of other products Note. This table reports regression results on the effect of EXIM support on US exports, for aerospace industry (NAICS 3364) and other industries separately. Variables are defined as in Table 5 . Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at country-industry level. Superscripts *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Table 5 . Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at country-industry level. Superscripts *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
est number ever for small businesses (US EXIM Bank, 2007 Bank, , 2013 , our interpretation here is that EXIM authorization to small businesses does not generate dollar value to the export kitty of the US and EXIM support is not a lifeline to small businesses' exports as claimed by the EXIM Bank proponents. 14 To summarize, while the baseline results (Table 5) show that EXIM authorization does not have a contemporaneous or lagged export-promoting effect, we do find that EXIM authorization to sectors other than aerospace products exerts some positive effect on US exports (Table 6 ). Moreover, the positive effect is mainly driven by the Bank's authorization to American companies that are not classified as small by the Bank (Table 7) .
Foreign ECA competition
A common argument around the EXIM Bank is that without its export financing, foreign companies would turn away from American goods and buy products from exporters whose countries offer ample export financing through its state ECAs. In other words, without US EXIM financing, Jet
Airways 15 would not buy any Boeing aircrafts but would instead buy Bombardier aircrafts to benefit from export financing provided by the Canadian ECA, Export Development Canada.
In situations where export financing is indeed provided by the US EXIM Bank, foreign compa- 14 We also provide evidence on the effect of EXIM authorization (for small and non-small businesses separately) across regions in Table A 17 https://www.uschamber.com/above-the-fold/costs-closing-ex-im-mount-house-vote-nears 18 According to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, the OECD Arrangement reportedly has saved US taxpayers about US$800 million annually. The information can be accessed from the website of Office of United States Trade Representative at https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/wto-multilateral-affairs/oecd. 19 The requirement to categorize all loans and long-term guarantees in its annual report came through in the reauthorization of the US EXIM Bank in 2012. Therefore, we are able to calculate the estimated export value directed to meet foreign ECA competition for the years 2012 and 2013. three times more expensive than Enhanced Equipment Trust Certificate (EETCs), which are assetbacked bonds used by domestic airlines to finance plane purchases. 20 Even, between the participants to the OECD Arrangement, ECAs have increasingly turned to tools outside of the Arrangement (e.g. market windows, untied financing, and investment support) to finance projects abroad (US EXIM Bank, 2015) .
Given these opposing anecdotal evidence, in this section we investigate this rising debate on whether EXIM authorization enables US exporters to compete with foreign exporters that receive ample financing from their home-country ECAs. To do so, we use a number of measures to capture the effect of the competition the US faces from exports supported by other countries' ECAs. The first measures is constructed as
where M j,k,c,t−1 is country j's imports of good k from country c in year t−1, and I c,t is a dummy that takes on the value of one when country c has a government-backed export credit agencies. Table A The second measure takes further into account the similarity of the competing country's export structure to that of the US, based on the assumption that ceteris paribus when a country's bundle of exports to a market is more similar to the US exports in the same market, this country poses a stronger competition to the US and thus creates additional inventive for the US EXIM to support its exports to this market. Specifically, this measure takes the following form:
where ESI U S c,t−1 is the export similarity index measuring the overlap of country c's composition of exports with that of the US, defined a la Finger and Kreinin (1979) as
Here ESI U S c,t−1 varies between zero and one, with zero indicating completely different export structure and one representing identical export bundle to the US. Intuitively, (11) measures the competition US product k faces in a foreign market j in year t from competing countries' ECAs, weighted by each country's similarity to the US in export bundle. For the ease of interpretation of the variation, 20 http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-budget/246347-the-arguments-for-ex-im-no-one-can-rebut.
both (10) and (11) are standardized so that they have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one.
The theoretical underpinning of the above two foreign competition measures is that a country's demand for foreign goods is intrinsic to the funds available to purchase this demand. Therefore, an exporting country that has a government-backed ECA has a greater potential to influence an importing country's demand for US products, especially when the exporting country's export structure is similar to that of the US. In other words, both ECA support and export structure similarity to the US would make an exporting country more of an competitor to US exports in the global market. 21 A look at the distributions of the two measures, (10) and (11), in Table 8 indicates that US exports to the European region face maximum competition from EXIM-financed exports by other countries, and that the competition is stronger when the export bundles are more similar. On the contrary, it is the Caribbean region where the US exports face the least competition from EXIM-financed exports by other countries. It should be noted that the relative ranking of the regions across the four measures is stable.
For the regression analysis, we introduce the interaction terms between the foreign EXIM Bank competition measures (G as defined in (10) or (11)) and the EXIM authorization variable, and re-estimate eq. (5) on the country-industry-year sub-sample which includes all sectors other than aerospace products. From the results presented in columns 1-6 of Table 9 , we see that the estimated coefficient of the interaction terms between EXIM authorization and the measures of foreign ECA competition sway between positive and negative values but remain invariably indifferent from zero in a statistical sense. These results indicate that the export-promoting effect of EXIM authorization is not affected by foreign ECA competition, irrespective of which of the two foreign ECA competition measures we use.
Given the landscape of international commitments under various international institutional arrangements, competition for US exporters in the global marketplace may accentuate. In particular, while ECA-related export credit activities of the participants to the Arrangement have to follow the negotiated financing terms and conditions in the Arrangement, non-participants to the Arrangement are not obligated to do so. We therefore proceed to investigate whether the mediating effect of foreign ECA competition is influenced by competing countries' accession to the OECD Arrangement. 22 In doing so, we further extend the above measures (13) and (14) by adding a multiplicative 21 To put it simply, consider the following example. Supposing India has demands for aircrafts whose purchase depends largely on the internal and external funds at its disposal. Assume that the demand for external funds is greater than the available internal funds. While Indian buyers of aircraft can obtain the required funds from various private financing sources such as the debt and equity markets, countries of aircraft manufacturers can also provide the required funds to the Indian buyer. Such financing is provided by the countries through their ECAs. Now suppose there are two countries that export aircrafts, the US which has a government backed export credit agency, and Brazil which does not. If the US provides export financing through its ECA, Indian buyers are more likely to make its aircrafts purchase from the US manufacturers than from the Brazilian counterparts, ceteris paribus. However, now consider a third country, Canada, who also exports aircraft and has a government-backed ECA. In addition, in terms of the composition of goods, there is more similarity between Canada's exports and US exports to India than that between Brazil's exports and US exports to India. In such a case, Indian buyers are more likely to make their aircraft purchases from the two countries with ECAs, i.e. US and Canada, ceteras paribus. Compared to Brazil, Canada is thus more of a competitor to the US in the Indian market. 22 It should be noted that WTO members are also governed by WTO's "Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures" (SCM) which lists the conditions under which ECA financing provided by ECAs of WTO members shall be considered as export subsidies. Although the clause in WTO's SCM attempts to safeguard the interest of OECD Note. This table reports the averages of the standardized foreign ECA competition measures G for different regions and years. See eq. (10), (11), (11), and (14) for the exact definitions of G. 
(8) Note. This table reports regression results on the intermediating role of foreign competition in the relationship between US EXIM support and US exports. G is foreign ECA competition measure as defined in eq. (10), (11), (11), and (14) . Other variables are defined as in Table 5 . Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at country-industry level. Superscripts *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
item OECD c,t−1 which indicates whether exporter c is a signatory to the Arrangement in year t − 1:
Again, both (13) and (14) are standardized so that their mean is zero and standard deviation is one. 23 The results are reported in Table 9 . Columns 7-12 show that competing countries' accession to the Arrangement has no additional impact on ECA competition effect. This result suggests that, ceteras paribus, EXIM authorization has no effect on US exports to a market which is also sought after by competing countries who are governed by the OECD Arrangement. This finding is broadly consistent with the notion that the Arrangement ensures orderly and healthy competition between the participating members of the Arrangement. Moreover, it also indicates the counteracting effect of WTO's SCM Agreement by ensuring orderly use of ECA financing.
We then examine whether the mediating effect of foreign ECA competition is influenced by the size of American companies who received EXIM funds. It is seen that EXIM authorization to small businesses has gone up in the recent years (see the previous section), and yet it is not clear whether support on small businesses creates more export opportunities as the Bank claims (US EXIM Bank, 2007 , 2013 . We see from columns 1-6 of Table 10 that in general EXIM support, whether it is on small or larger companies, does not play a significant role in determining the conditioning effect of foreign ECA competition. Columns 7-12 show that the differential effect of the OECD Arrangement is mostly insignificant, except on one occasion (column 10) where the effect is marginally significant at the 10% level and a one standard deviation increase in this competition measure reduces the export effect of EXIM support by 0.1% when US exporters are competing against ECA-supported exports from OECD countries with a similar export structure to the US.
To summarize, we find that regardless of the degree of ECA-financed export competition US firms face in a foreign market, US EXIM Bank's support does not promote US exports in a detectable Arrangement-participants, the ambiguity in the clause leaves room for countries to maneuver such that ECAs from countries, not Arrangement-participants but WTO members, tend to indulge in providing financing (to its exporters) at terms and conditions that are not viable by the Arrangement-participants. A case in point is the rising number of cases at the WTO for dispute settlements on the violation of the clause on export credits in the WTO's Agreement. One widely reported example is Canada's complaint with the WTO on Brazil violating the SCM Agreement; see the WTO webpage for more details on this disputed case: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds46_e.htm. While in principle both the Arrangement and SCM are binding regulatory frameworks for many competing countries of the US, SCM has a much more universal coverage. To be precise, in our data virtually all (98.4%) of these competing countries' exports (in dollar values) are destined for WTO members, of which only half (51.6%) land in OECD Arrangement countries. Therefore the OECD Arrangement effect we look at here captures the differential effect of the OECD Arrangement relative to WTO export credit regulations, as part of the impact of foreign ECA competition on US exports. 23 The four measures of foreign ECA competition are highly correlated with each other, with the pairwise correlation coefficient constantly above 0.77 and significant at the 1% level. See Table A .4, Appendix A for the correlation matrix. 
(8) Note. This table reports regression results on the interacted role of foreign competition and EXIM financing to small businesses in the relationship between US EXIM support and US exports. Variables are defined as in Table 5 and Table 7 . Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at country-industry level. Superscripts *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
way. We also find that while in general the mediating effect of foreign EXIM Bank competition is not affected by the size of American companies that receive the EXIM support, it is constrained by the export credit regulations among OECD countries.
Industry upstreamness and cross-industry effects of EXIM authorization
Now we assess the effects of EXIM authorization in the context of US domestic value chains.
We first look at how EXIM authorization affects firms located in different sections of the value chain.
In theory it is not clear whether upstream sectors benefit more or less from EXIM finance than downstream sectors. On the one hand, since upstream sectors rely heavily on the domestic market, EXIM authorization on firms in these sectors may not benefit their exports as much as in downstream sectors. On the other hand, if the US firms in US upstream sectors are also major upstream suppliers in the global market (e.g. firms in the oil industry), EXIM authorization may boost their exports.
To have an empirical answer to the net effect, we interact EXIM authorization with a continuous measure of the sector's upstreamness in the US economy adopted from Antràs et al. (2012) . The results are presented in Table 11 . The estimates from models of different time lags show that the export-promoting effects of EXIM support are lower in sectors that are located more towards the upper end of the value chain, but none of these interactions show statistically significance, suggesting that the differences are indistinguishable. Table 5 . Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at country-industry level. Superscripts *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
Next we check the cross-industry spillover effect of EXIM authorization. Specifically, we are interested in how EXIM authorization to firms in a given industry affects the exports of other industries that are suppliers or buyers to this given industry. An underlying hypothesis is that EXIM support on exports of intermediate inputs in upstream industries may fuel the growth of downstream industries in other countries and thus creates additional competition to US downstream exporters. This possibility suggests the necessity of checking the externality of EXIM authorization across industries.
To measure the spillover effect of EXIM authorization from other linked industries in the value chain, we weight EXIM authorization in other industries by the cross-industry linkages constructed from input-output coefficients. 24 We use two measures to capture the spillover effect on a given industry in the value chain, one through its links with upstream industries (supplying industries) and the other through its links with downstream industries (demanding industries). The first takes the form of
where α kq is the proportion of industry k's total input that is supplied from industry q, and EXIM qt is the total EXIM support in industry q in year t. The above measure captures the amount of linked EXIM support in the upstream industries (supplying industries) of industry k in year t. The second takes the form of
where β kq is the proportion of industry k's total output that is supplied to industry q, and EXIM qt is the total EXIM authorization in industry q in year t. This measure captures the amount of linked EXIM authorization in the downstream industries (demanding industries) of industry k in year t. The two parameters for the above cross-industry linkages, α kq and β kq , are from the US Input- Output   Table 2007 .
Note that since the above cross-industry measures of EXIM authorization are only available at the industry-year level, we now aggregate our data to the same level for regressions. Without previously used control variables at a more disaggregated level, our regressions here only serve descriptive purposes. The results, shown in Table 12 , suggest that EXIM authorization has no statistically significant impact both within and across industries.
Conclusions
In this paper, we provide evidence on the export-promoting effects of US EXIM Bank authorization. We find that EXIM authorization does not affect US exports across all industries. In fact, it is sectors other than that of aerospace parts and products (NAICS 3364) where EXIM authorization has a positive and significant impact on US exports. Moreover, we find that it is those American businesses that are not classified as small whose exports are more likely to benefit from EXIM au- 24 Some other studies such as Javorcik (2004) and Amiti and Smarzynska Javorcik (2008) construct and apply crossindustry linkages in a similar way albeit in different contexts. Table 5 . Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at countryindustry level. Superscripts *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
thorization. No export benefit from EXIM authorization to small American businesses is detectable.
We also find no evidence on whether financing provided by competing countries' ECAs accentuates competition for US exporters in the global marketplace. These results do not change qualitatively when we control for competing exporters' accession to the OECD Arrangement. When taking into account inter-industrial links in the value chain, our results show that the above-found ineffectiveness of EXIM authorization is insensitive to an industry's position in the value chain, and also no evidence affirms the existence of spillover effect of EXIM support across sectors.
Our paper contributes to the growing literature that studies the impact of ECA financing on country exports. Yet, to the best of our knowledge, ours is the first study that provides rigorous empirical evidence in relation to the claims that the US EXIM Bank facilitates US exports through its trade financing programs, and in doing so helps US exporters to counter government-backed financing offered by foreign countries through their ECAs.
The findings in this study also provide important policy lessons for countries, especially lower middle-income countries (e.g. Ghana) that are now in the inception stages of establishing their own ECAs, and other countries (e.g. India and Thailand) that are placing ever more importance to ECA financing in encouraging domestic exports. A possible avenue of future research which is in our agenda is to have a cross-country study of the effect of ECA trade financing activities and investigate the policy making process behind the establishment and running of ECAs across countries of different political regimes.
A Appendix Table 5 . Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at country-industry level. Superscripts *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Note. This table reports regression results on the heterogeneous effects US EXIM support on US exports across regional markets with North America being the reference (omitted) market. Variables are defined as in Table 5 and Tale 7. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at country-industry level. Superscripts *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
